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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970439-CA 
v. : 
ROY LEE GLASPER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's verdict finding him guilty of burglary and 
theft, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that defendant 
unlawfully entered the Deseret Industries Manager's office for the purpose of committing 
theft? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing sufficiency-of-evidence challenges from 
criminal bench trials," this Court "'must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence.'" State v. Gurr. 904 P.2d 238,241 (Utah App. 
1995) (quoting State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988)). 
2. Did the trial court properly impose consecutive sentences where defendant's 
crimes arose out of a single criminal episode but involved separate criminal acts? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law which the appellate 
court reviews for correctness. State v. Stettina. 868 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following controlling statutes are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1997); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a January 27, 1997, information with burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 1-2). After 
initially requesting a jury trial, defendant chose to try his case to the bench (R. 133). 
Following a bench trial on April 2, 1997, defendant was convicted of both counts (R. 53-
56). After several delays (R. 67-68, 71), defendant was sentenced to two consecutive 
zero-to-five year sentences on July 7,1997 (R. 78-79), and filed a timely notice of appeal 
(R.91). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early evening of January 24, 1997, defendant and his companion, Shanta 
Venson, drove into Cedar City in a red Jaguar sports car (R. 184, 240). They stopped at 
Maurice's, a clothing store, where Venson purchased several items using a credit card (R. 
241, 251). A short while later the two pulled into the parking lot of a Deseret Industries 
Thrift Store [,,DIM] (R. 242). Although the DI had just closed, the front doors to the main 
floor of the store remained unlocked so employees could bring in sales merchandise from 
the front sidewalk (R. 180). Following standard procedure, employees had placed a 
"CLOSED" sign on the front door and turned off the bank of lights closest to the front of 
the store (R. 180, 204, 208, 226). 
Defendant and Venson entered the store separately (R. 243). Venson remained 
near the front of the store to choose a belt for purchase while defendant moved to the 
back of the store among the clothing racks (R. 197, 199, 217). Another couple entered 
the store soon thereafter (R. 197). There were no DI employees on the sales floor at this 
time (R. 196,252). 
Store manager Dennis Goldsworthy was putting away the day's receipts and 
preparing the daily deposit in his private office at the back of the store (R. 180, 192). 
Hearing unfamiliar voices at the front of the store, he went out of his office to investigate 
(R. 180-81). He left a bank deposit bag containing $794.00 in cash and $329.96 in checks 
sitting on his desk in the office (R. 186-88). When he reached the front of the store he 
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informed Venson and the other couple that the store was closed (R. 181). The second 
couple left immediately but Venson became "somewhat animated" and repeatedly insisted 
on purchasing a fifty cent belt (R. 181-82). Goldsworthy, who was unaware that 
defendant was also in the store, agreed to sell her the belt but only if she had exact change 
(R. 181, 195). He explained that all of the money had been removed from the cash 
registers (R. 181). 
As Goldsworthy performed the transaction, DI employee Joy Stover came up the 
stairs to the main floor (R. 216). Stover observed defendant near the manager's office 
and saw him "walk over behind the clothes fixture and kind of slink down and walk 
towards the front of the store" (R. 217, 223). As defendant weaved his way towards the 
front door, she noticed the bank bag in his hand and watched him "put the bag under his 
shirt" (R. 218-19). Defendant and Venson exited the store together (R. 184). When 
Stover told Goldsworthy what she had observed, Goldsworthy immediately rushed to the 
office and discovered that the bank bag was missing (R. 182-84, 220). Store employees 
raced to the parking lot where they approached the closest vehicle, which was occupied 
by the couple that had entered the store after defendant (R. 213, 232-33). By the time the 
employees determined that defendant and Venson were not in the car, defendant's red 
Jaguar was leaving the parking lot (R. 184). The employees then notified police about the 
incident and described defendant's vehicle (R. 233). 
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A report of the incident with the vehicle description went out on the police radio 
(R. 153-54). Officer Preston Griffiths was patrolling 1-15 northbound near Parowan when 
he heard the report (R. 156). Shortly thereafter he observed a vehicle matching the 
report's description pass by at a high rate of speed (R. 157). Officer Griffiths eventually 
caught up with the car and pulled it over after it exited 1-15 (R. 158). When defendant got 
out of the Jaguar and came toward the police car, Officer Griffiths drew his weapon, 
ordered defendant onto the ground and handcuffed him (R. 158-59). A subsequent 
search of the vehicle uncovered the bank bag, torn up checks made out to Deseret 
Industries, and a deposit slip (R. 175-77). The missing cash, amounting to $794.00, was 
found in Venson's left sock (R. 164). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found sufficient evidence to convict defendant of burglary. 
Defendant concedes that he intended to commit theft. The only contested issue is 
whether defendant unlawfully entered the manager's office. However, uncontested 
testimony at trial established that the manager's office was not open to the public and that 
defendant did not have permission to enter the office. 
Furthermore, the authority relied upon by defendant is not on point. Defendant 
quotes at length from a non-Utah case dealing with a narrowly tailored burglary statute 
for buildings open to the public. Utah's burglary statute specifically criminalizes 
unlawful entry into private portions of a building even when the building is open to the 
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public. Since the evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant unlawfully 
entered the private office to commit theft, each element of the crime was established. 
Regarding sentencing, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402 (1995) permits 
consecutive sentences for all separate offenses committed during a single criminal 
episode. Here, the trial court found that the DI incident constituted a single criminal 
episode and that each charge arose from distinct criminal acts within that episode. 
Defendant first unlawfully entered the private manger's office at the back of the store 
with intent to commit theft. With the crime of burglary complete, defendant then 
proceeded to steal the bank deposit bag, stuffing it under his shirt before leaving the store. 
Thus, defendant completed the separate crime of theft. Based on these separate acts, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive zero-to-five 
year sentences in accordance with section 76-1-402. 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF 
BURGLARY BECAUSE HE UNLAWFULLY ENTERED A NON-PUBLIC 
PORTION OF THE DESERET INDUSTRIES STORE WITH INTENT TO 
COMMIT THEFT 
This Court should uphold defendant's burglary conviction because the trial court 
properly found that each element of the crime had been met. Defendant argues that his 
entry into the manager's office was not "unlawful" for purposes of the burglary statute 
because "there was no stated or even implied prohibition to the public's entering the 
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office."1 Br. of Aplt. at 8. However, the trial court made specific findings of fact that the 
manager's office was not open to the public, and these findings of fact are supported by 
the record. 
A defendant advancing an insufficiency of the evidence claim must "marshal all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support 
the findings against an attack." State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-6 (Utah 1990); see 
also State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) ("Because defendant has 
failed to meet his marshaling burden, we likewise decline to consider this claim."). Far 
from marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's verdict, defendant 
continues to reargue his version of events which was explicitly rejected at trial. State v. 
Scheeh 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to review a claim of insufficient 
evidence where defendant's brief merely reargued his case while ignoring much of the 
evidence supporting the verdict). Defendant concedes his intent to commit theft, but 
argues that he did not enter or remain in either the store of the manager's office 
defendant maintained below that he took the money from near the cash register, 
not from the office (R. 245-47). While he mentions this fact in his brief, Br. of Aplt. at 4, 
he does not provide any reason why the trial court could not have found the contradictory 
testimony of the two DI employees sufficiently persuasive to dispel any reasonable doubt 
raised by defendant's version of the events. See State v. Carlsen. 638 P.2d 512, 515 
(Utah 19811 cert, denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982): State v. Wright 893 P.2d 1113, 1117 
(Utah App. 1995) (refusing to weigh conflicting evidence or substitute appellate court 
judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of witness credibility). 
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unlawfully. Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. He claims that there was no prohibition on the public 
entering the manager's office, and that the manager did not consider defendant's entry to 
be a trespass. Id. at 8. However, he makes no mention of the evidence supporting the 
determination that he entered both the store and the manager's office unlawfully, 
including: that the cash registers were empty at the time he entered the store (R. 181, 
191); that it was standard procedure to keep all money in the office upon closing (R. 191-
93); that each day's cash and receipts remained in the office for twenty four hours, 
meaning that there was always money in the office (R. 190-91); that Goldsworthy never 
observed defendant in the vicinity of the cash registers from which defendant claims he 
stole the bank bag (R. 196-99), or that a DI employee put defendant near the manager's 
office with the bank bag in his possession (R. 217-19, 223). Due to defendant's failure to 
adequately brief his sufficiency claim, this Court should not consider its merits. 
If this Court chooses to consider defendant's claim, it has only "limited authority" 
to do so. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992). "When reviewing 
sufficiency of evidence challenges from criminal bench trials," this Court "'must sustain 
the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence.'" State v. 
Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 786 
(Utah 1988)). 
Utah law defines burglary as unlawful entry into "a building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit a felony." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1995) 
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(emphasis added).2 In the case of buildings open to the public, such as a Deseret 
Industries store, the statute still criminalizes entry into any part of the building "not open 
to the public" for purposes of committing a felony when "the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3) (1995). 
In this case, the trial court found that defendant had entered into a restricted 
portion of the Deseret Industries store, the manager's office (R. 265-66). Store manager 
Dennis Goldsworthy testified that it was after closing time and that he had left the deposit 
bag on a desk in his private office before going to the cash registers at the front of the 
store to help defendant's accomplice (R. 187). The office is a separately enclosed room 
at the back of the store with a sign on the door that reads "Manager" (R. 186, 194-95). 
The office contains a desk and a safe, and always has its blinds closed (R. 191-94). 
Goldsworthy testified that only employees are allowed in the office and that he never 
gave defendant permission to enter the office (R. 186, 202). Another store employee saw 
defendant in the vicinity of the office and witnessed him "put the bag under his shirt" 
before exiting the store (R. 217-18). Under these facts, the manager's office cannot be 
said to be "open to the public." Crediting the testimony of the DI employees, the trial 
court correctly determined that the office was not "open to the public" and that defendant 
had entered the office unlawfully "only for the purpose of committing a theft" (R. 264-
2Defendant concedes the intent element and challenges only whether his entry was 
unlawful. Br. of Aplt. at 6. 
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66) (a copy of the ruling is attached in Addendum B). The record clearly supports the 
trial court's determination. 
Specific language covering "portions'1 of a building distinguishes Utah burglary 
law from the authority relied upon by defendant. In Utah, when an actor unlawfully 
enters "any portion" of a building which is "not open to the public" with intent to commit 
a felony, he commits burglary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3). In contrast, the court in 
Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska App. 1985), relied on by defendant, interpreted the 
Alaska burglary statute for buildings open to the public.3 The court felt constrained by 
the specific statutory language to consider the premises as a whole because, unlike Utah's 
burglary statute, Alaska's did not differentiate between a building and private portions of 
a building. 14 at 893; compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3), with Alaska Stat. § 
11.46.310(a) (1997). But see State v. VowelL 837 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Hawaii App.) 
(criticizing the Alaskan court's position and finding separate "building" in private offices 
of a dance club open to the public), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 144 (Hawaii 1992).4 Thus, 
3Alaska Stat. § 11.46.310(a) (1997) reads: "A person commits the crime of 
burglary in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
with intent to commit a crime in the building." 
4Two other cases cited by defendant are factually distinct. As in Utah, both 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin require that the criminal entry be made into an area not open 
to the public. See Wis. Stat. § 943.10 (1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502 (1997). In both 
cases the prosecution failed to show that such an entry occurred. In Champlin v. State, 
267 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. 1978), the defendant stole a television and cash register from a 
hotel lobby. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the defendant made no unlawful 
entry because the lobby was open to the public twenty-four hours a day. Id. at 299. 
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defendant's reliance on the reasoning of Arable is misplaced. Utah's burglary statute 
specifically addresses cases where, as here, the crime takes place in a separately secured 
or occupied portion of a building which is otherwise open to the public. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-201(1) & (3). Therefore, even accepting defendant's argument that the store 
remained open to the public at the time he entered the front door, the evidence adduced at 
trial was sufficient to convict defendant of burglary. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BECAUSE SUCH 
SENTENCES ARE AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AND APPROPRIATE 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Defendant argues that he should not receive consecutive sentences for his burglary 
and theft convictions because the crimes arose out of a single criminal episode. Br. of 
Aplt. at 8-9. However, his claim fails because consecutive sentences are authorized by 
statute under the circumstances at hand and are appropriate in this case. This issue 
presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for correctness. State v. 
Stettina. 868 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah App. 1994). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401(5) (Supp. 1997), specifically allows for 
imposition of "consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cost 362 A.2d 1027 (Perm. 1976), the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court found no burglary in the assault and robbing of a tavern owner tending bar 
because the tavern was open to the public at the time of the incident. 
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episode." Here, the trial court found "two separate offenses within the same course of 
conduct" to justify imposing consecutive sentences for defendant in this case (R. 124). 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1995).5 
Defendant cites Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(1) to claim that he should be 
punished "under only one of the offenses [theft or burglary] and the sentences should run 
concurrent." Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. That section provides: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of the code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). Defendant essentially argues that, under the facts of this 
case, the theft and the burglary are a single act because there would be no crime at all if 
he had not committed both acts. Br. of Aplt. at 9. To the contrary, his two sentences 
arise from distinct criminal acts and were properly imposed. 
Defendant conceded his intent to commit theft (R. 246-47, 253; Br. of Aplt. at 6), 
and the trial court found that "the defendant entered that office unlawfully . . . and only 
5Although at sentencing the trial court stated that the burglary was complete when 
defendant entered the Deseret Industries store (R. 123-24), the court had previously held 
in handing down its verdict that defendant committed burglary when he entered the 
manager's office (R. 264-66) (see Addendum B for a copy of both rulings). While the 
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of burglary for either entry, the State focuses on 
the latter entry relied upon by the trial court in convicting defendant. Cf State v. Shipler, 
869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1994) ("This court 'may affirm the trial couifs decision on 
any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another reason for its ruling.5") 
(quoting State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)). 
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for the purpose of committing a theft therein[,] which is burglary" (R. 266). Thus, 
defendant completed the crime of burglary upon entering the manager's office with the 
requisite intent; his act of actually taking the money was not necessary to complete the 
burglary. Subsequently, defendant committed the separate crime of theft when he 
f,exercise[d] unauthorized control" over the bank bag. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1995). Such conduct establishes "separate offenses under a single criminal episode" 
which are punishable separately. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. 
In State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
an argument similar to the one advanced by defendant. The Court stated, "Although 
defendants' crimes were committed during a single criminal episode, the crimes were a 
result of separate and distinct acts that resulted in separate and distinct crimes [Thus], 
the trial judge was well within his discretion in sentencing defendants for four separate 
crimes." Id. at 900 (affirming consecutive sentences for, among other crimes, aggravated 
burglary and theft); see also State v. Horton 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah App.) (noting 
defendant's concession that consecutive sentences for burglary and theft were proper), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Mane. 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 1989) 
(finding a single criminal episode and "concluding] that defendant committed four 
separate and distinct crimes. The court did not, therefore, err by imposing four 
consecutive sentences."). 
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Because the trial court correctly found defendant's illegal acts constituted separate 
offenses which were part of the same criminal episode, this Court should affirm 
defendant's consecutive sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
^ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / c l a y of May, 1998 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
was mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Floyd W. Holm, attorney for appellant, 





76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. another statute, § 76-6-704. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense, 
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const, 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating Amend. V; $ 77-1-6. 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction. 
(8) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the 
defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist 
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. (2) and redesignated accordingly the subsec-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; tions following. 
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
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PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Civil provisions, en-
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. try and detainer, § 78-36-1 et seq. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Agreement to commit 
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-6-202. burglary, conspiracy, § 76-4-201. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. cial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq. 
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-6-404. Shoplifting Act, 5 78-11-14 et seq. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
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saw the defendant she described him as the back wall 
between the office and the front door hunched down 
and she saw him put the bag in his pants. That's a 
direct route from the office, down the side door, 
and then where everybody saw him sneak around and go 
out. He went in the office. He stole the money. 
He committed burglary and theft. I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Can I see Exhibit 2. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Exhibit 2, do you have that or 
is it over here? 
MR. HOLM: Oh, I had it at one point. I 
hope I didn't --
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I find 
the defendant guilty of the offense of theft, a 
third-degree felony based upon the stipulations 
entered in the case. 
With regard to the charge of burglary, the 
Court cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant entered the store, itself, unlawfully as 
it appears that others had not observed the closed 
sign and that there was insufficient notice to him 
that the store was, in fact, closed, especially in 
view of the fact that the door was open. 
However, the Court is convinced beyond a 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 00264 
1 reasonable doubt that the money bag was in the 
2 office and not on the counter near the cash 
3 register. The reasons are this: First of all, if I 
4 was to except the defendant's version as argued by 
5 his counsel that Mr, Goldsworthy brought the bag out 
6 of the office and put it on the counter near the 
7 cash registers when he responded to the noise that 
8 he heard outside, that would mean that he would have 
9 seen the defendant standing there at the cash 
10 registers, which didn't happen apparently. 
11 Mr. Goldsworthy didn't see the defendant. 
12 The defendant didn't see Mr. Goldsworthy. So that 
13 didn't happen. The testimony from Mr. Goldsworthy 
14 is that this money bag -- this -- and this money had 
15 been in the safe prior to closing, and that's borne 
16 out by the fact that the Exhibit 2, which is the 
17 deposit slip that accompanied this deposit, is dated 
18 January 23rd, the day before. This was yesterday's 
19 money on the 24th, not today's, and there's 
20 absolutely nothing that would explain why Mr. 
21 Goldsworthy would be packing around a money bag from 
22 the day before. 
23 It would have been in the safe as he 
24 testified. He would have removed it from the safe 
25 for the purposes of putting the receipts from the 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971 00265 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
24th still in the cash register drawers into the 
safe, and then he would have put the bag back on top 
of those drawers. That makes sense. It's borne out 
by the date on the exhibit. 
I find that the money was, in fact, in the 
office, that the defendant entered that office 
unlawfully, the office door bearing a sign manager 
and only for the purpose of committing a theft 
therein which is burglary. 
Now, I note that this appears to be a 
single criminal episode, and he's only going to be 
punished for one of these offenses. In any case, 
under the law, do you want to argue that? 
MR. BURNS: I would argue that, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: On what basis? 
MR. BURNS: On the basis, as I understand 
single criminal episode, there's the requirement 
that there be overlapping elements. In this case I 
would submit to the Court that the burglary is the 
unlawful entry with the intent to commit the theft 
and having been caught there he has committed the 
offense of burglary. 
He doesn't get to walk if he goes ahead 
and commits the actual theft so the fact he 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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considered a single criminal episode for purposes of 
running it concurrently, and we would submit it. We 
believe that the matter is a matter of discretion 
with the Court at any length, and we would submit 
it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Glasper, anything you 
would like to say before I impose sentence? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I didn't come to 
Utah with the intent to steal anything. I was 
passing through here. We actually was shopping for 
some warm clothes at the time. I did -- once I was 
in the store I did commit the theft, but that wasn't 
my intention to go in the store and steal anything 
from them or else I wouldn't have parked a red 
Jaguar in the front door of the store if I had 
intended on going and stealing something from them. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, Mr. Glasper, 
the difficulty is that you made that presentation to 
the jury, and they didn't buy it. And I can't buy 
it at this point either. I'm not going to overrule 
the jury. So you stand convicted of burglary, a 
third-degree felony, and theft, a third-degree 
felony. 
Now, as I understand the facts in this 
case, your position at the trial was that you walked 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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in innocently to do shopping and found this bag of 
money on the counter next to the cash register and 
took it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The jury obviously rejected 
that version of the facts and instead --
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't have a jury, sir. 
THE COURT: I mean the Court, the trier of 
fact, I should say, and found you guilty based on 
the fact that you entered the premises with Ms. 
Luvet --is that her name? 
THE DEFENDANT: Shanta, yeah. 
THE COURT: Yeah, Shanta -- is it Shanta 
or Shanta? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Shanta Luvet Venson and that 
she appeared to be engaged in performing some sort 
of distraction so that you could basically check out 
the premises for something to take. I think that's 
the version of the facts that the Court accepted. 
So there was a burglary when you entered 
the building with the intent that Ms. Venson would 
distract the clerk while you checked out the 
premises because that was entering the premises with 
the intent to commit a theft. That's totally a 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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separate incident and was completed by the time you 
entered the premises totally separate from the 
taking of the money# which the Court found came from 
the office, not from the cash register area. The 
Court accepted that, the testimony of the employees 
of the building that the money was last seen sitting 
on the manager's desk back in his office. 
So I find that these are two factually 
separate offenses committed within the same criminal 
episode in the sense that they're -- itfs one 
continuing course of conduct to accomplish a 
criminal purpose, but they were two separate 
offenses within that same course of conduct and 
totally separate and apart from one another. They 
are not a crime with a lesser and included offense. 
You don't have to commit theft to commit 
burglary; you don't have to commit burglary to 
commit theft. They're totally separate offenses, 
and under the facts in this case, I think they can 
be punished separately. 
Now, do you want to address the issue of 
whether there should be consecutive sentencing in 
the case, Mr. Glasper? Is there anything you want 
to say on that? Do you understand what consecutive 
means? 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Y e s . 
2 THE COURT: Is there anything you want to 
3 add on that? Anything? No? Well, Ifm less than 
4 impressed, Mr. Glasper, by your honesty in this 
5 matter, especially this last episode where you got 
6 up on the witness stand and under oath denied that 
7 you were the person who suffered many of the 
8 convictions that are listed in the presentence 
9 report. It now appears that, in fact, you were the 
10 person and your photograph is attached to the 
11 documents that support that. 
12 THE DEFENDANT: There was a lot of those 
13 pictures that still wasn't mine -- (inaudible.) 
14 THE COURT: Well, you swore that every --
15 all of the offenses after a certain date -- and I 
16 can't remember which date it was -- did not apply to 
17 you, and obviously, that was fabrication. That's 
18 just the last in a series of things that make me 
19 think that you're a criminal, Mr. Glasper, and that 
20 you are a danger to the community, and you belong 
21 behind bars until you decide to change your ways. 
22 THE DEFENDANT: I didn't --a lot of these 
23 -- these thefts I was arrested, but I was never 
24 charged with them, you know. There simply was 
25 a r r e s t . 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 6 5 2 - 9 9 7 1 
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1 THE COURT: As I understood your testimony 
2 and as you gave your testimony, you said those 
3 weren't me, that wasn't me. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Quite a few of them, yes, 
5 sir. 
6 THE COURT: Thatfs totally different from 
7 saying, yeah, that was me, but they never charged 
8 me. Sentence you to serve zero to five years in the 
9 Utah State Prison on each of the third-degree 
10 felonies. The terms are to run consecutive one to 
11 the other. No fine is imposed. There is no -- is 
12 there restitution, Mr. Burns? 
13 MR. BURNS: No. 
14 THE COURT: No restitution is ordered. 
15 You1re committed to the custody of the sheriff to be 
16 turned over to the Department of Corrections to 
17 serve that sentence. You have 3 0 days to perfect an 
18 appeal from any action of the Court, Mr. Glasper. 
19 The 30 days begins to run today. If it is your 
20 intention to appeal, you have to file written notice 
21 with the Court within the next 30 days or else you 
22 will lose your right to appeal. Do you understand 
23 your right to appeal? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible.) 
25 THE COURT: Good luck to you, Mr. 
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